A Research Framework for the "Euro Crisis"] more. In Marxist as well as non-Marxist scholarly literature, the concept of legitimacy used to be a central category for the theorization and analysis of the state in capitalist society. However, during the s retrenching of the welfare However, during the s retrenching of the welfare state and the TINA globalization decade of the s it increasingly disappeared from critical research on the particular form the internationalization of the state has taken as part of the European regional integration project.
The belle epoque of neo-socialdemocracy during the second half of the s and the first half of the s marked the last step in the exhaustion of the utopian energies that had emerged from the s cultural rebellion. Its inscription into neoliberalism and the neoliberal transformation of social democracy has not only severely damaged traditional social democracy, but along the collapse of Eastern and Western communism and the generally declining integrative potentials of former catch-all parties it has also entailed the emergence of right-wing populist parties or forces within first-past-the-post voting systems as an almost universal byproduct of neoliberal social restructuring.
It is the first left-wing articulation of the contradictions of neoliberalism that has hindered the rise of right-wing populism at the national level, which in still seemed inevitable, and embodies a new left that is not merely a remainder of the fallen Western new left or Eastern communism. The leftist articulation of the contradictions of neoliberalism, however, do not imply that right-wing populism has been banned for good.
Factor analysis has been used to answer this question results not shown here: The structure of correlations displayed in Table 3 explains why this is the case: Both in the West and in the East at all five points in time, the anti-west and the anti-east items, when separated, correlated positively and in a satisfactory magnitude among themselves, whereas the pooling of all eight items results in close to zero inter-item correlations.
Obviously, for the resulting antiwest index the range of values is o no item approved by the respondent to 5 all items approved by the respondent ; the corresponding anti-east index, because of the smaller number of items, ranges from o to 3. The resulting two indices are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 for the two samples.
In , West Germans rejected the negative stereotypes the East Germans might have harbored against them, although they did so less than in Secondly, the index reinforces the observation that East Germans are much more polarized in their views than West Germans. There is little disagreement in the East that the West Germans are guilty of mishandling the affairs of their Eastern compatriots, and there is also little disagreement among the Easterners that they are not guilty in unification matters. WZB ; voting-age population 6. This would answer the question of whether there was an identifiable political belief context behind the response patterns in the data, as contrasted with the possibility that on the individual level the responses just represent idiosyncratic reactions to day-to-day political stimuli.
Table 6 documents the construction of the typology both in the West and in the East. It does, however, serve to sharpen the contours of the findings, particularly with respect to the fact that the majority of East Germans consistently sees all fault with West Germans and hardly any with themselves. Compared to in the West, the I data shows stability, with a small decrease in the number of Positivists and an even smaller increase in the number of Negativists. By contrast, in the East the name of the game is outright externalization: If one accepts the conceptualization of inner unity as it was done in this article, then there is precious little question that the two Germanies held different viewpoints in this matter to start with, and that the seven years into a unified Germany have not produced a West-East rapprochement, at least not on the basis of the data used in this analysis and certainly not, as shown before, on the basis of other findings.
One piece of information available as a comparative yardstick across the time dimension pertains to the two sociostructural criteria of age and education. As table 7 shows, neither variable is very strongly related to the typology. Two differences between the types are nevertheless worth noting. Particularly in the West, higher education goes above average with the Positivists, and it is this type which is also by far the youngest of the four types both in the West and the East.
While one could be tempted to speculate that these characteristics make the Positivists an especially promising type for inner unity, the empirical basis for this speculation without additional pertinent data is too shaky to build a strong argument on. Typology of West-East German Stereotypes percentages. For this analysis, it has to be kept in mind first that in about 40 percent of the respondents in both samples could not be classified on the voting question because they either did not know or refused to answer, or indicated they would not vote.
In addition, in the West the present government received only 34 percent and in the East a 21 percent share of a potential vote. In the early summer of , there is not a single type in both parts of Germany where the conservative-liberal government can muster a majority. This is a major change certainly with the Positivists who were favoring the present coalition all along, but also for the Eastern Internalizers and the Western Externalizers. However, in the East the two types of Externalizers and Negativists, who put the blame for the problems with unification on the West Germans, are still a stronghold for the postcommunist PDS.
In sum, though, one can maintain that the differences with respect to how the process of unification is perceived, are no longer related to the partisanship of the respondents in a similarly clear-cut fashion as before. While such data was not available for the survey, the authors of this article were permitted access to three questions which were asked by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in the same study from which the typology was derived see Table 8.
It varies between o statistical independence and 1 perfect dependence. It only measures the degree of covariation between two variables, but does not indicate its direction. These differences, it was argued, reflect both the effects of political socialization under totalitarian rule and of context, particularly the high rate of unemployment in the East this latter point is strongly emphasized by Zelle The support of Hans-Joachim Veen and Carsten Zelle in providing access to this data is highly appreciated.
While it is not possible to derive a causal interpretation from these cross-sectional data, we can reasonably speculate that lagging acceptance of democratic rule and the favorable recollections of socialism are both welded together with a feeling that the West Germans have not done enough to make unification work in the East, as epitomized by the economic strains there.
In the West, the attitudes on democracy and socialism are as in and, other than in , not very much related to leftright vote intention: By contrast, in the East these attitudes are still substantially shaped by partisan cues, not the least because there still exists a strong pds at the extreme left which crystallizes the frustrations and dissatisfactions in the new Lander regarding the unification process.
In this sense, the consolidation phase in the East has, even seven years after the transformation of the political system, not yet come to an end. Based on social-psychological identity theories, the reasons for this development have become a little clearer. The threat to the social identity of the East Germans through unification has been underestimated, and they are now reconstructing their biographies in a manner which helps them to establish a positive self image: Since the constitutional and practical logic of unification makes the West Germans the most plausible reference group for East-West comparisons, it therefore cannot come as a surprise that these comparisons for reasons of Eastern identity-building must result in a distancing process.
For one, the economic strains have increased to a point where the name of the political game is no longer the distribution of growth, but of losses in the German welfare state. Jahrhundert , Jb. Dazu bespricht er die Ausstattungsurkunden des Bischofs Johannes I. Die beiden deutschsprachigen Urkunden vom Die beiden in Mainz und Speyer erhaltenen Ausfertigungen sind von einer Hand geschrieben.
Der Ausstellungsort ist nicht genannt.
Somnium viridarii, tome 1, ed. Die Hg. DA 40, , gibt hier die lateinische Vorlage nach drei der insgesamt sieben ihr bekannten Hss.
Kristeller, Iter Italicum, Bd. Lissabon, Arquivo nacional da Torre do Tombo, Der Text ist nach Paris, Bibl.
Auch kann als Autor der Kompilation nachdem A. The Theodosian Code. Edited by Jill Harries and Ian Wood. Adelheid Krah , Lex episcoporum et ceteris clericorum. Leipzig Bd. Leipzig, Univ.
Conrat Cohn vermerkt wurde. Seine Bedenken gegen dieses Postulat untermauert F. Index verborum Graecorum, quae in Actis Synodi Lateranensis a. Sie sind im ersten Teil S. Diese beiden Teile der Arbeit offenbaren die fast unentwirrbare Verflechtung der Glossen, ihre schwierige, oft hypothetisch bleibende Scheidung in Glossenschichten, Glossenkompositionen und Glossenapparate und ihre Zuordnung zu einzelnen Autoren. Durch den Tod des Hg. David R. Wie die Gegenseite auf diese Demonstration reagiert, zeigt der Vf.
Helen C. A Reconsideration, Mittellateinisches Jb.
Christian Science War Time Activities/Chapter 04
Pontifikatsjahr Gregors XI. In der Einleitung Teil 1, S. Dem Inventar soll die Publikation der Vollregesten bzw. Gut zur Darstellung gebracht wird nebst der Brieflehre S. Die Entwicklung der Urkundenlehre ist nach der Mitte des Bernhard von Meung und seiner Schule kommen dabei pionierhafte Bedeutung zu. Hervorzuheben ist C. Von C.
DA 49, Emil J. Brill, XVII u. Beigegeben sind Addenda zum 1. Band Hss. Ein paar Bemerkungen: Petrus de Vinea S. XV Langlois usw. Herren ; vgl. Die Vf. Damit erhalten die Hisperica famina einen bisher nicht erkannten Stellenwert in der Tradition antiker Rhetorik. Edmunds bilden gewisse Schwerpunkte der zeitlich von Beda bis ins DA 39, November als Todestag bezeugt. Die Hss.
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